With the recent advancements in scientific comprehension of genetics and the decipherment of complex techniques for editing human genomes, liberal eugenics—eugenic ideal premised on the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism that leaves reproductive choices to parents rather than anachronistic statist authoritarian interventions—has inevitably become a polarising conundrum in contemporary liberal societies as to its utility and destructiveness. Focusing on one species of liberal eugenics—namely, genome editing interventions—I contend that liberal eugenics could be harmful—harm herein construed as that which undermines (...) the salient liberal values of equality, autonomy, and pluralism—since it is itself antithetical to the bases of the liberal society. This contention is based upon three premises: first, that individuals are rather seldom rational decision-makers such that leaving all reproductive choices to the whims of individual parents would be immensely counterproductive to future offspring’s right to open future; second, that liberal eugenics—much like its authoritarian antecedent—could intersect with myriad identities, including race, class, sex, disability, and sexual orientation in ways that might exacerbate social divisions, marginalise different groups, and engender homogeneity; and third, that it undermines individual autonomy of the future person as a member of the liberal community, particularly if their capacities and abilities are tailored to fit parents’ specific life projects and putatively reasonable conceptions of the good. The underscored potential malaises of liberal eugenics should, I argue, be discursively negotiated between parents and the state via the development of robust general laws that regulate heritable genome editing interventions to ensure that the welfare of the future persons is prioritised and that the liberal commitment to autonomy is immune to antiliberal perversions. (shrink)

This article critically discusses the state of STS, expressing feelings of discontent regarding four aspects: policy relevance, conceptual language, too much focus on complexity, theoretical styles. Middle range theory is proposed as an alternative, promising avenue. Middle range theories focus on delimited topics, make explicit efforts to combine concepts, and search for abstracted patterns and explanatory mechanisms. The article presents achievements in that direction for technology dynamics, particularly with regard to the role of expectations, niche theory and radical innovation, and (...) the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical transitions. (shrink)

Ever since the works of Alfred Tarski and Frank Ramsey, two views on truth have seemed very attractive to many people. On the one hand, the correspondence theory of truth seemed to be quite promising, mostly, perhaps, for its ability to accomodate a realistic attitude towards truth. On the other hand, a minimalist conception seemed appropriate since it made things so simple and unmysterious. So even though there are many more theories of truth around - the identity theory, the (...) prosentential theory, etc. -, it is fair to say that these two views have acquired the status of the main contenders in the field. Most recently, John Searle and David Lewis have taken sides on the issue. Searle defends a new version of the correspondence theory which takes facts to be the correspondents of true statements, whereas Lewis wants to hold on to a minimalist conception of truth - allowing for an appendix of purely ontological claims that he extracts from the correspondence theory. What is new is that both have tried to see the correspondence theory not as a rival to the minimalist conception, but rather as essentially compatible with it. Still, in the end, Searle arrives at his version of the correspondence theory, and Lewis votes for minimalism. Both philosophers have sympathy with the spirit of the correspondence theory, to say the least. So one wonders why it is that they come to so different conclusions. Both start from the spirit of the correspondence theory, and both see it as essentially compatible with the heart of the minimalist conceptions, and still is there no agreement on what theory is to be accepted in the end. (shrink)

According to John Searle’s well-known Is-Ought Argument, it is possible to derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. This argument concerns obligations involved in institutions such as promising, and it relies on the idea that institutions can be conceptualized in terms of constitutive rules. In this paper, I argue that the structure of this argument has never been fully appreciated. Starting from my status account of constitutive rules, I reconstruct the argument and establish that it is valid. This reconstruction reveals that (...) the soundness of the argument depends on whether collective acceptance as such can generate obligations. Margaret Gilbert has argued that it can, and thus far some of her central arguments have not been addressed. The upshot is that the Is-Ought Argument deserves to be taken seriously once again. (shrink)

Biomarker-based predictive tests for subjectively asymptomatic Alzheimer’s disease (AD) are utilized in research today. Novel applications of artificial intelligence (AI) promise to predict the onset of AD several years in advance without determining biomarker thresholds. Until now, little attention has been paid to the new ethical challenges that AI brings to the early diagnosis in asymptomatic individuals, beyond contributing to research purposes, when we still lack adequate treatment. The aim of this paper is to explore the ethical arguments put (...) forward for AI aided AD prediction in subjectively asymptomatic individuals and their ethical implications. The ethical assessment is based on a systematic literature search. Thematic analysis was conducted inductively of 18 included publications. The ethical framework includes the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Reasons for offering predictive tests to asymptomatic individuals are the right to know, a positive balance of the risk-benefit assessment, and the opportunity for future planning. Reasons against are the lack of disease modifying treatment, the accuracy and explicability of AI aided prediction, the right not to know, and threats to social rights. We conclude that there are serious ethical concerns in offering early diagnosis to asymptomatic individuals and the issues raised by the application of AI add to the already known issues. Nevertheless, pre-symptomatic testing should only be offered on request to avoid inflicted harm. We recommend developing training for physicians in communicating AI aided prediction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay tells the story of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's “dissociation of concepts,” which they introduced in 1958 and is in use as a tool of criticism by many rhetorical critics. The story begins in England with John Locke's development of associative reasoning in 1770 and then moves to France, with Remy de Gourmont extending associative reasoning with the concept of dissociation in 1899. Gourmont's dissociation crosses the Atlantic and is then developed by Kenneth Burke in 1931. In turn, Perelman (...) and Olbrechts-Tyteca absorbed and expanded Locke, Gourmont, and Burke's theories of association and dissociation in 1958. They crafted a tool, the dissociation of concepts, that equips rhetorical reasoning with the capacity to navigate between the promise and perils of fission and fusion. Since 1958, many scholars have made productive use of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's innovation. The essay concludes with some possible futures for their dissociation of concepts. (shrink)

Even in a regulated and competitive market economy the behavior of firms leaves much to be desired. Looking beyond the invisible hand of the market and the iron hand of the law, this chapter outlines and assesses arguments for the intangible hand of civil society. The central mechanisms in our model depend on the importance of social esteem and self-esteem. Such esteem depends on assessments of true intentions and dispositions for costly pro-social actions. Instrumental or reputation-shaping pro-social actions matter little (...) in the economy of esteem. What is required is a common belief that conformity to certain costly standards benefits all; and that conformity is observable and elicits social approval (and vice versa). We acknowledge and review why in the realm of competitive commercial organizations, the challenges may be considerable for the intangible hand model to take hold. Moralizing (or professionalizing) the firm’s agents, inducting the voice of affected parties in the deliberation of firms, public (if strategically delayed) disclosure of internal deliberations, and public commitments by senior leaders all offer promise in enacting an economy of esteem in the world of competitive commercial firms. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...) unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us. (shrink)

We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an important task of philosophy is to provide the bigger picture. To this end, it should investigate folk views and determine whether and how they can be preserved once scrutinized from the perspective of the sciences. However, the sciences typically present us with a fragmented picture of reality. Thus, an important intermediate step is to integrate the most promising social scientific theories with one another. In addition (...) to this, social ontology can provide input to and benefit from other philosophical disciplines that engage in normative theorizing. Thus, we propose that social ontology connects not only with folk ontology and scientific ontology but also with fields such as ethics and political philosophy. Building bridges between them serves to formulate a credible and encompassing worldview that is of theoretical and practical significance. (shrink)

Rogers & McClelland's (R&M's) précis represents an important effort to address key issues in concepts and categorization, but few of the simulations deliver what is promised. We argue that the models are seriously underconstrained, importantly incomplete, and psychologically implausible; more broadly, R&M dwell too heavily on the apparent successes without comparable concern for limitations already noted in the literature.

In a series of articles written for the Neue Rhenische Zeitung in 1850, later published by Friedrich Engels as The Class Struggles in France, Karl Marx looked back on the failed French revolution of 1848 and attempted to explain how the democratic aspirations that inspired the February assault on the July Monarchy-and promised to fulfill the dashed hopes of 1789, 1792, and 1830-also led to its termination in the reactionary popular dictatorship of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Popular sovereignty, which had so (...) often defined the emancipatory visions of two generations of radical activists and thinkers was now not only an obstacle to genuine emancipation, but a plebiscitary source of power for newly emergent forms of political domination. Bonapartism became, for Marx, an important way of understanding the complex internal dynamics of popular-and later "populist"-authoritarianism. It is an analysis that continues to resonate powerfully today. The national enthusiasm that propelled the revolution forward, and which overturned the hated regime of Louis Phillippe in three glorious days, had successfully established for the first time in history a parliamentary republic based in universal male suffrage. The Second Republic's provisional government was immediately thrown into a legitimation crisis, however, by the underlying sectional, parliamentary, and class conflicts lurking beneath its illusory foundation in the people's unitary will. When the popular classes of Paris returned to the barricades in June to protest the conservative government's closure of the National Workshops-and to convert the political revolution into a social revolution based in the "right to work"-they were abandoned by their fellow citizens and thousands were massacred in the streets by Cavaignac's National Guard. The "fantastic republic" built around the pretensions of national unity, Marx proclaimed, quickly "dissolved in powder and smoke." Tocqueville described the June days as a "slave's war," and in its aftermath the Party of Order quickly consolidated its power against any furthering of revolutionary aspiration. (shrink)

Secular change in sex ratios is examined in relation to experience in the family. Two theoretical perspectives are outlined: Guttentag and Secord’s (1983) adaptation of social exchange theory, and sexual selection theory. Because of large-scale change in number of births and typical age differentials between men and women at marriage, low sex ratios at couple formation ages existed in the U.S. between 1965 and the early 1980s. The currently high sex ratios, however, will persist until the end of the century. (...) High sex ratios appear to be associated with lower divorce rates, male commitment to careers that promise economic rewards, male willingness to engage in child care, higher fertility, and higher rates of sexual violence. Sexual selection theory calls attention to intrasexual competition in the numerically larger sex. (shrink)

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Keynesian model of government regulation and social entitlement was widely overrun by a resurgence of marketplace economics. Far from fulfilling its promise of unbridled personal freedom and global prosperity, however, the ensuing decade of economic crisis and ongoing disenfranchisement has led many to rethink fundamental beliefs about social justice and the distribution of wealth. Not surprisingly, John Dewey’s call for a “Great Community” figures prominently in this discussion. In 2009, Omar Swartz, Katia Campbell (...) and Christina Pestana explored the promise of Dewey’s democratic community in Neo-Pragmatism, Communication, and the Culture of Creative Democracy. This new collection of.. (shrink)

This initial volume in a series of new translations of Plato’s works includes a general introduction and interpretive comments for the dialogues translated: the _Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, _and _Menexenus. _ _ _“Allen’s work is very impressive. The translations are readable, lucid, and highly accurate. The general introduction is succinct and extremely clear. The discussion of the dating of the dialogues is enormously useful; there has previously been no brief account of these issues to which one could refer the (...) student. Finally, the particular introductions are first rate: fine jobs of clear philosophical and historical explanation—succinct and yet sophisticated, both close to the text and philosophically incisive.”—Martha Nussbaum, _Brown University_ “This is an important work that deserves our respect and attention.”—_Ethics _ _ _“This and the promised succeeding volumes will probably become the standard English version of the complete dialogues…. The commentaries take advantage of the best scholarship, judge judiciously between divergent views, and often introduce new and brilliant interpretations. This is true both in the area of philosophy and in that of literary criticism.”—Anthony C. Daly, S.J., _Modern Schoolman_ _ _“Allen is a superb translator, whose elegantly simple yet precise language gives access to Plato both as a philosopher and as a literary artist.”—_Library Journal__ _ “An important event in the world of scholarship.”—_London Review of Books_ _ _R.E. Allen is professor of classics and philosophy at Northwestern University. (shrink)

Few passages in Hobbes’s writings have generated as much critical interest as the notorious reply to the fool – one who believes it is reasonable to renege on our promises whenever it is advantageous for us to do so. In his reply, Hobbes appears to argue that it is never reasonable to renege on our promises because doing so is never in our prudential interest. The problem is not only that this reply seems wrong, but further that it seems inconsistent (...) with Hobbes’s own philosophical commitments. This research note argues that the reply makes sense if we are willing to read it as an incompletely worked-out claim about the prudence of sometimes preventing oneself from being fully prudent in the future. (shrink)

Fears about the sustainability of oil-rich communities and hopes that petroleum would fuel financial, social, and moral renewal have accompanied the oil industry since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century. With each successive ecological disaster caused by oil spills, debates over the industry's ecological sustainability sharpen. Discussions about the geological sustainability of the petroleum industry intensify when oil supplies tighten, and dissipate when they increase. Although concerns about the moral viability of communities dependent on oil have become radically unfamiliar since (...) the late nineteenth century, these, too, were once central to debates about the effects of oil on human society. In the nineteenth century, the progress that oil promised to bring was to be measured not only in material wealth, but in the attainment of social harmony and the attenuation of political strife. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Narrative Ontology by Axel HutterFrank SchalowHUTTER, Axel. Narrative Ontology. Translated by Aaron Shoichet. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022. xiii + 296 pp. Cloth $69.95; paper, $26.95Where postmodernism has dominated the language of contemporary philosophy, there is a need to develop an alternative discourse to address perennial philosophical issues. In Narrative Ontology, Axel Hutter proceeds along this path by introducing narration or a form of storytelling to reinscribe "the three (...) ideas that have belonged since time immemorial to the heart of philosophical reflection: freedom, God and immortality." Hutter's defense of his thesis is twofold. First, he distinguishes narration as a temporal enactment embodied in telling a story, the scope of which is sufficiently universal as to found a new understanding of history, its alpha and omega. Second, he appeals to the biblical account of the tribulations of Jacob and Joseph as retold in the narrative style of Thomas Mann's novel Joseph and His Brothers. "The first reason a philosophical enquiry seeks to connect with Thomas Mann is that he himself accommodates a reciprocal illumination of philosophy and literature by situating his own way of thinking and working in explicit proximity to philosophy." "The second reason this philosophical enquiry seeks to connect with Thomas Mann is that he accommodates a narrative ontology of meaning, by contemplating, in his way, the same fundamental question."Along with an introduction, Hutter divides his book into three parts. In Part One ("The Stories of Jacob"), Hutter undertakes a precise explication of Mann's novel, in order to illustrate how ontology can be reconstituted as a narrative event that redefines "being" as a foundational act of history. "Jacob's sentences give expression to the hope that God can preserved the possibility of the future even if it seems to be destroyed in the fire of death." Form (that is, the narrative style) and content (that is, the interwoven meanings of the biblical text of Jacob as told and retold) are united. "This characterizes how Thomas Mann reads the original text.... The manner of his reading is articulated, in fact, in the Joseph novel itself.... Thus, a complex intertwining of narrative levels of meanings emerges: the inner meaning of the original story consists in a narrative ontology in which being is understood—in a sense that is still in need of elucidation—narratively and historically: as (hi)story. For an adequate understanding, this original story is re-narrated by Thomas Mann himself with the explicit intention of raising the original meaning of the story, its narrative ontology, clearly into consciousness."In Part Two ("Time and Meaning"), Hutter explores the thematic and methodological implications of narration as an attempt to infuse meaning into history and, conversely, through its own self-illustration, to chart the course of what is historical, that is, the transmission of future [End Page 143] understanding through the recovery of the past. Thus, storytelling renders history concrete, and, reciprocally, history challenges the narrator to plumb the depths of its greatest mysteries. According to Hutter, the Joseph novel embodies Mann's effort to meet this challenge. Storytelling is a way of preserving the past, but only under the condition of welcoming the promise of the future. "Yet the story that the Joseph novel narrates concretely is the story of Abraham and his blessing that is handed down to his descendants. In the peculiarly timeless omnipresence of this story, the tradition of the figure of Abraham is joined with the prophecy of the blessing that is not only promised to Abraham but to all his heirs."In Part Three ("The Stories of Joseph"), Hutter examines the dynamic of conversion or the transformative movement from self-love to compassion. He appeals to these spiritual elements to check the nihilistic tendency to exalt the individual both as the center of freedom and as the ground of social relations. Another kind of bond is necessary to overcome the abyss of meaninglessness, which is prefigured in ancient times and becomes most evident today in postmetaphysical forms of nihilism. "The 'whole theology' of the Joseph novel revolves around the Abrahamic covenant between God and human being—a covenant that, as already stated, implies a theory of... (shrink)

A key to the shortcomings and confusions afflicting 20th century social science seems to be problematic moral underpinnings or "disguised ideologies" that drive much of its research and theory. Philosophical hermeneutics shows great promise for diagnosing this condition and reorienting human science inquiry in helpful ways. However, it has been suggested by a number of thoughtful critics that hermeneutics has not yet taken the full measure of the kinds of "power" that can imbue and distort human communication, including social (...) theory and research. This paper addresses several of these critiques, finds merit in them, but argues that such concerns about power may be able to be addressed more adequately by a hermeneutic approach than by the viewpoints from which they are raised. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Advocates of moral enhancement through pharmacological, genetic, or other direct interventions sometimes explicitly argue, or assume without argument, that traditional moral education and development is insufficient to bring about moral enhancement. Traditional moral education grounded in a Kohlbergian theory of moral development is indeed unsuitable for that task; however, the psychology of moral development and education has come a long way since then. Recent studies support the view that moral cognition is a higher-order process, unified at a functional level, and (...) that a specific moral faculty does not exist. It is more likely that moral cognition involves a number of different mechanisms, each connected to other cognitive and affective processes. Taking this evidence into account, we propose a novel, empirically informed approach to moral development and education, in children and adults, which is based on a cognitive-affective approach to moral dispositions. This is an interpretative approach that derives from the cognitive-affective personality system (Mischel and Shoda, 1995). This conception individuates moral dispositions by reference to the cognitive and affective processes that realise them. Conceived of in this way, moral dispositions influence an agent's behaviour when they interact with situational factors, such as mood or social context. Understanding moral dispositions in this way lays the groundwork for proposing a range of indirect methods of moral enhancement, techniques that promise similar results as direct interventions whilst posing fewer risks. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology is widely understood as involving an integration of evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, in which the former promises to revolutionise the latter. In this paper, I suggest some reasons to doubt that the assumptions of evolutionary theory and of cognitive psychology are as directly compatible as is widely assumed. These reasons relate to three different problems of specifying adaptive functions as the basis for characterising cognitive mechanisms: the disjunction problem, the grain problem and the environment problem. Each of (...) these problems can be understood as arising from incommensurate characterisations of the nature and role of 'the environment' in the two approaches. Purported solutions to the problems appear to require detailed information concerning the EEA (environment of evolutionary adaptedness), with the disjunction problem placing the lowest requirement, the environment problem placing the highest requirement, and the grain problem placing an intermediate one. In each case, such information is not likely to be forthcoming, because it may require iterating through successively more distant EEA's with no principled stopping point. This produces a dilemma for evolutionary psychology - either to solve these apparently insoluble problems, or to attempt to avoid them but in doing so forego detailed evolutionary constraints on cognition. (shrink)

In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which (...) does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect. (shrink)

Karin de Boer has given the best account so far of the reform of Wolffian metaphysics that Kant promised. But does such a reform cohere with the revolutionary goal that Kant also affirmed? Standpoint is singled out as the central meta-concept of Kant’s revolutionary goal, and it is argued that, in the second and third critiques, Kant himself developed his revolutionary insight into the perspectival character of both concept and judgement in ways that he did not anticipate at the time (...) of the first critique, when his promise to reform metaphysics was made. The question is raised what room Kant’s revolution leaves for doctrinal and not merely disciplinary judgements in both general and special metaphysics, and also whether the opening of new vistas may have drained metaphysical reform of its interest. (shrink)

- And what is the public interest? - That's for politics to decide! - Does that mean that the public interest is the interest of politicians? - It may seem that way, but this is a democracy. It's really the people that decide about the public interest. The politicians merely fill in the details after the voters have set down the broad outlines. That's why it is important that you vote in the next election. Your vote counts as much any (...) man's. - I do not doubt that it does, but how much does any man's vote count? Politicians make all sorts of statements. Their programs are complex packages in nice wrappers, sealed until after the election. We can only vote on vague promises, without knowing which ones, if any, the Elect intend to keep. And when the votes are in, the elected politicians decide what our vote meant. Give us a note, they say, and we'll turn it into a symphony. What nonsense! Why should I vote if somebody else determines the meaning of my vote? Voting is like writing a blank cheque. - Hmm, I see. Still you cannot deny that democracy is better than dictatorship. Therefore you should vote, to demonstrate that democracy is in the public interest. (shrink)

JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK. Surprises in logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 253. Some people, not just beginning students, are at first surprised to learn that the proposition “If zero is odd, then zero is not odd” is not self-contradictory. Some people are surprised to find out that there are logically equivalent false universal propositions that have no counterexamples in common, i. e., that no counterexample for one is a counterexample for the other. Some people would be surprised (...) to find out that in normal first-order logic existential import is quite common: some universals “Everything that is S is P” —actually quite a few—imply their corresponding existentials “Something that is S is P”. Anyway, perhaps contrary to its title, this paper is not a cataloging of surprises in logic but rather about the mistakes that did or might have or might still lead people to think that there are no surprises in logic. The paper cataloging of surprises in logic is on our “to-do” list. -/- ► JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK, Surprises in logic. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected] There are many surprises in logic. Peirce gave us a few. Russell gave Frege one. Löwenheim gave Zermelo one. Gödel gave some to Hilbert. Tarski gave us several. When we get a surprise, we are often delighted, puzzled, or skeptical. Sometimes we feel or say “Nice!”, “Wow, I didn’t know that!”, “Is that so?”, or the like. Every surprise belongs to someone. There are no disembodied surprises. Saying there are surprises in logic means that logicians experience surprises doing logic—not that among logical propositions some are intrinsically or objectively “surprising”. The expression “That isn’t surprising” often denigrates logical results. Logicians often aim for surprises. In fact, [1] argues that logic’s potential for surprises helps motivate its study and, indeed, helps justify logic’s existence as a discipline. Besides big surprises that change logicians’ perspectives, the logician’s daily life brings little surprises, e.g. that Gödel’s induction axiom alone implies Robinson’s axiom. Sometimes wild guesses succeed. Sometimes promising ideas fail. Perhaps one of the least surprising things about logic is that it is full of surprises. Against the above is Wittgenstein’s surprising conclusion : “Hence there can never be surprises in logic”. This paper unearths basic mistakes in [2] that might help to explain how Wittgenstein arrived at his false conclusion and why he never caught it. The mistakes include: unawareness that surprise is personal, confusing logicians having certainty with propositions having logical necessity, confusing definitions with criteria, and thinking that facts demonstrate truths. People demonstrate truths using their deductive know-how and their knowledge of facts: facts per se are epistemically inert. [1] JOHN CORCORAN, Hidden consequence and hidden independence. This Bulletin, vol.16, p. 443. [2] LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Kegan Paul, London, 1921. -/-. (shrink)

Virtual reality (VR) technology has emerged as a promising tool for studying and rehabilitating gait disturbances in different cohorts of patients (such as Parkinson's disease, post-stroke, or other neurological disorders) as it allows patients to be engaged in an immersive and artificial environment, which can be designed to address the particular needs of each individual. This review demonstrates the state of the art in applications of virtual walking techniques and related technologies for gait therapy and rehabilitation of people with movement (...) disorders makes recommendations for future research and discusses the use of VR in the clinic. However, the potential for using these techniques in gait rehabilitation is to provide a more personalized approach by simulate the experience of natural walking, while patients with neurological disorders are maintained localized in the real world. The goal of our work is to investigate how the human nervous system controls movement in health and neurodegenerative disease. (shrink)

Is the welfare state neutral to personal morality?1 In today's welfare states one can find numerous life-styles existing side by side. These indicate a wide scope for 'personal moralities'2, but do not prove that the welfare state is 'neutral' to them. Welfare states interfere in more or less onerous ways with the business of (private) life with police checks, administrative controls and a vast arsenal of regulatory, penal and/or fiscal regimes. Some of the regulations may be more or less reasonable (...) attempts to minimise the risk of one person inflicting irreparable damage on others or their property, but a great many are not. It is not too difficult to see the hand of special (economic, ideological, even sectarian) interests in the bulk of the rules and regulations on the books.3 The state's non-neutrality is often an unintended outcome, but not always. Officials introduce new regulations with proud declarations of their intention to enforce particular 'moral choices', to treat one thing as a 'merit good' and another as an evil. They also justify intrusive policies with blatantly paternalistic arguments—remember their promise, or was it threat, to take care of us "from the cradle to the grave"—, with self-congratulatory references to an unspecified 'responsibility of the government'. There is no more direct negation of the role of private morality than the claim that one discharges one's own responsibility by depriving others of the opportunity to exercise theirs. As far as protection against onerous interference is concerned, the presumption of innocence—which is the linchpin of the rule of law—counts for very little. One delinquent person or business entity is often enough to let loose the regulatory juggernaut on everybody in the same group or category. In short, the question, whether the welfare state is neutral to personal morality, is largely rhetorical and academic. Behind the question there is the presupposition that the welfare state should be neutral to personal morality.. (shrink)

In a recent review article published in this journal, Hansen and Schaltegger discuss the architecture of sustainability balanced scorecards. They link the architecture of SBSCs to the maturity of the value system of a firm as well as to the proactiveness of a firm’s sustainability strategy. We contend that this argument is flawed and that the architecture of SBSC does not matter since—irrespective of their architecture—SBSCs are ill-suited to achieve substantive corporate contributions to sustainability. First, we assess the SBSC against (...) three fundamental conditions for an effective management of corporate sustainability—the generation of positive outcomes at the societal level, the consideration of complexities and tensions, and the integration of heterogeneous and competing logics—to show that the SBSC is diametrically opposed to the complex and multi-facetted nature of corporate sustainability and ill-suited to achieve transformational change of for-profit organisations towards sustainability. Second, we address the question whether architecture of the SBSC matters and find that it is a fallacy to believe that the architecture of SBSCs can address this fundamental misfit. Rather, our argument reveals that irrespective of its architecture the SBSC is not a suitable tool for achieving strategic change for sustainability beyond incrementalism because it is deeply rooted in the idea of aligning sustainability with established core business routines. We propose that the emerging integrative view on corporate sustainability offers a more promising route for scholars and practitioners who are truly concerned with a deep transformation of private firms towards more sustainability. (shrink)

Background: Smart sensors have been developed as diagnostic tools for rehabilitation to cover an increasing number of geriatric patients. They promise to enable an objective assessment of complex movement patterns. -/- Objective: This research aimed to identify and analyze the conflicting ethical values associated with smart sensors in geriatric rehabilitation and provide ethical guidance on the best use of smart sensors to all stakeholders, including technology developers, health professionals, patients, and health authorities. -/- Methods: On the basis of a (...) systematic literature search of the scientific databases PubMed and ScienceDirect, we conducted a qualitative document analysis to identify evidence-based practical implications of ethical relevance. We included 33 articles in the analysis. The practical implications were extracted inductively. Finally, we carried out an ethical analysis based on the 4 principles of biomedical ethics: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The results are reported in categories based on these 4 principles. -/- Results: We identified 8 conflicting aims for using smart sensors. Gains in autonomy come at the cost of patient privacy. Smart sensors at home increase the independence of patients but may reduce social interactions. Independent measurements performed by patients may result in lower diagnostic accuracy. Although smart sensors could provide cost-effective and high-quality diagnostics for most patients, minorities could end up with suboptimal treatment owing to their underrepresentation in training data and studies. This could lead to algorithmic biases that would not be recognized by medical professionals when treating patients. -/- Conclusions: The application of smart sensors has the potential to improve the rehabilitation of geriatric patients in several ways. It is important that patients do not have to choose between autonomy and privacy and are well informed about the insights that can be gained from the data. Smart sensors should support and not replace interactions with medical professionals. Patients and medical professionals should be educated about the correct application and the limitations of smart sensors. Smart sensors should include an adequate representation of minorities in their training data and should be covered by health insurance to guarantee fair access. (shrink)

Each annual Ontology Summit initiative makes a statement appropriate to each Summit’s theme as part of our general advocacy designed to bring ontology science and engineering into the mainstream. The theme this year is "Towards an Open Ontology Repository". This communiqué represents the joint position of those who were engaged in the year's summit discourse on an Open Ontology Repository (OOR) and of those who endorse below. In this discussion, we have agreed that an "ontology repository is a facility where (...) ontologies and related information artifacts can be stored, retrieved and managed." -/- We believe in the promise of semantic technologies based on logic, databases and the Semantic Web, a Web of exposed data and of interpretations of that data (i.e., of semantics), using common standards. Such technologies enable distinguishable, computable, reusable, and sharable meaning of Web and other artifacts, including data, documents, and services. We also believe that making that vision a reality requires additional supporting resources and these resources should be open, extensible, and provide common services over the ontologies. (shrink)

In the slipstream of several large-scale corporate scandals, the board of directors has gained a pivotal position in the corporate governance debate. However, due to an overreliance on particular methodological (i.e. input–output studies) and theoretical (i.e. agency theory) research fortresses in past board research, academic knowledge concerning how this important governance mechanism actually operates and functions remains relatively limited. This theoretical paper aims to contribute to the promising stream of research which focuses on behavioural perspectives and processes within the corporate (...) board, by delving into one of the research areas perhaps plagued most by these predominant approaches: board leadership. In adopting a team perspective on the board of directors our study goes beyond traditional board leadership research, which has turned a blind eye on actual leadership dynamics, by examining leadership processes and behaviours inside the board team. Specifically, we develop a conceptual framework addressing a novel and ethical approach to team leadership within the board, i.e. shared leadership, which has previously been demonstrated to result in performance benefits in various other team settings. (shrink)

In 1949, Philipp Frank claimed that he and Rudolf Carnap built up a new center for the scientific world conception in Prague between 1931 and 1935. The aim of this paper is to provide historical evidence and further materials to approach this claim of Frank. Definite answers, however, require more space and contextualization, so I will just sketch some partial but hopefully promising narratives and rudimentary answers. I claim that though Carnap and Frank indeed tried to build (...) a new center, they were unsuccessful, and possibly there were many reasons for this. This is the general claim; regarding Carnap, I will also show his way to the German University of Prague and his philosophical, scholarly, and cultural life in Prague. (shrink)

It is common knowledge that Frank Kermode is engaged in a major study of fiction and the theory of fiction. I assume that "Novels: Recognition and Deception" in the first number of Critical Inquiry is part of that adventure, and that it should be read in association with other essays on cognate themes which he has published in the last two or three years. This may account for my impression that the Critical Inquiry essay is not independently convincing. There (...) are splendid things in the essay, perceptions so definitively phrased that I cannot promise not to steal them. My copy of the journal is heavily marked on Kermode's pages, invariably on passages I dearly wish I had had the wit to write, notably his remark of certain fictions by Henry James that "they create gaps that cannot be closed, only gloried in; they solicit mutually contradictory types of attention and close only on a problem of closure." But these perceptions are like indelible events in the diction of a poem which, as a whole, does not seem to cohere. Denis Donoghue is professor of Modern English and American literature at University College, Dublin. His recent books include The Ordinary Universe: Soundings in Modern Literature, Emily Dickinson, Jonathan Swift: A Critical Introduction, William Butler Yeats, and Thieves of Fire. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, the United States Department of Agriculture funded international expeditions with the aim of finding plant specimens for introduction into the agricultural landscape and the new experimental projects in hybridization. One such agricultural explorer, noted for his eponymous lemon, was Frank Nicholas Meyer, an immigrant from the Netherlands whose expeditions in Asia have brought to the United States celebrated fruit and toxic weeds. Neither professional botanists nor farmers, plant hunters like Meyer worked by taking advantage (...) of historical allegiances to academic programs, while leaning on the authority of their newer national institutions. In addition to plants, through photographs that transposed Chinese landscapes to U.S. environmental counterparts, Meyer contributed to the imagination of the agricultural promise of the American West. The era of these plant explorers has ended but their material trace remains in a variety of spaces and modes of existence that have hitherto been disregarded. Reading Meyer’s letters shows the authority and discipline behind his transformation from gardener’s apprentice to professional plant collector. I argue that photographs and plants are understudied material traces that enable historians to re-examine the means by which credit was received, given, and exchanged. By drawing together these traces, I chart the continued importance of exploration and collection in the twentieth century and show the epistemic continuity between nineteenth-century natural history and twentieth-century experimental science. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that global scientific promises aka “scientific world-conceptions” have an interesting history that should be taken into account also for contemporary debates. I argue that the prototypes of many contemporary philosophical positions concerning the role of science in society can already be found in the philosophy of science of the 1920s and 1930s. First to be mentioned in this respect is the Scientific World-Conception of the Vienna Circle (The Manifesto) that promised to contribute (...) to the realization of an enlightened, rational and science-oriented society and culture. The Manifesto was not the only „scientific world-conception“ that philosophers and scientists put forward in the 1920s. Also the scientific world-conception of the philosopher and physicist Moritz Schlick, and the Weltanschauung of Sigmund Freud deserve to be mentioned. Still other examples of are Carnap’s Scientific Humanism and the project of The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science which was related to American pragmatism as well, as is shown by Charles W. Morris and others. Forgotten for a long time, since the beginning of the 21rst century, at least some of the Viennese projects are reconsidered in a new wave of „socially engaged philosophy of science”. (shrink)

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism (...) against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization , but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance. (shrink)

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism (...) against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization, but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance. (shrink)

Socially extended knowledge has recently received much attention in mainstream epistemology. Knowledge here is not to be understood as wholly realised within a single individual who manipulates artefacts or tools but as collaboratively realised across plural agents. Because of its focus on the interpersonal dimension, socially extended epistemology appears to be a promising approach for investigating the deeply social nature of epistemic practices. I believe, however, that this line of inquiry could be made more fruitful if it is connected with (...) the critical notion of epistemic responsibility, as developed in feminist responsibilism. According to feminist responsibilists, at the core of epistemic responsibility is a critical disposition toward correcting epistemic injustice. This epistemic idea is highly relevant to the epistemological context of illness, where patient testimony is often disregarded. Hence, though restricted to the epistemological context of the experience of illness, this chapter delves into epistemic injustice and its robust mechanisms. I thus explore what responsible epistemic practices should involve in order to redress that injustice and how epistemic responsibility should be socially extended. The discussion proceeds as follows. First, by relying on Arthur Frank’s innovative work on illness narratives, I focus on chaotic bodily messages from patients overwhelmed by suffering and then explain why these messages should count as genuine narratives or testimonies despite their inarticulateness. Second, I elaborate on how epistemic injustice concerning such narratives (i.e., chaos narratives) is produced and reproduced, in particular how both a dominant sociocultural norm and our inherent vulnerability can contribute to its production and reproduction. Finally, I propose an extended form of epistemic responsibility that ameliorates this aspect. Laying particular emphasis on the epistemic role of mature empathy, I characterise the extended epistemic responsibility in terms of extended empathic knowledge. (shrink)

We investigate the problem of how nonnatural entities are represented by examining university students’ concepts of God, both professed theological beliefs and concepts used in comprehension of narratives. In three story processing tasks, subjects often used an anthropomorphic God concept that is inconsistent with stated theological beliefs; and drastically distorted the narratives without any awareness of doing so. By heightening subjects’ awareness of their theological beliefs, we were able to manipulate the degree of anthropomorphization. This tendency to anthropomorphize may be (...) generalizable to other agents. God (and possibly other agents) is unintentionally anthropomorphized in some contexts, perhaps as a means of representing poorly understood.. (shrink)

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative (...) outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme. (shrink)

In this paper we present some concepts and their relations that are necessary for modeling autonomous agents in an environment that is governed by some (social) norms. We divide the norms over three levels: the private level the contract level and the convention level. We show how deontic logic can be used to model the concepts and how the theory of speech acts can be used to model the generation of (some of) the norms. Finally we give some idea about (...) an agent architecture incorporating the social norms based on a BDI framework. (shrink)

The common cause principle states that common causes produce correlations amongst their effects, but that common effects do not produce correlations amongst their causes. I claim that this principle, as explicated in terms of probabilistic relations, is false in classical statistical mechanics. Indeterminism in the form of stationary Markov processes rather than quantum mechanics is found to be a possible saviour of the principle. In addition I argue that if causation is to be explicated in terms of probabilities, then it (...) should be done in terms of probabilistic relations which are invariant under changes of initial distributions. Such relations can also give rise to an asymmetric cause-effect relationship which always runs forwards in time. (shrink)

In this essay, I will outline the adjustments in Heidegger’s account of technicity that are necessary to address the danger ( Gefahr ) that revolves around recent advances, including cybernetics. These adjustments that Parvis Emad was among the first to pioneer, are hermeneutic guidelines that delineate the wholesale appearance of beings through the prism of a “mathematical project”. The mathematical project of ‘nature’ creates a platform on which cybernetics can arise in two ways: 1). by converting the linear sequencing of (...) ‘time’ (as “making present”) into a universal form of calculation and 2). by subdividing ‘space’ into infinite points. The danger, then, does not lie in the ominous effects of technicity, but as a throwback to the metaphysical distortion of the reciprocity between being and time in which the former is confined to the presencing of beings through a model of calculability and the latter is reduced to the “digitizing” of a linear sequence of units. The hermeneutic guidelines allow for the “retrograsping” ( zürckgenommen [Emad’s translation] of the danger of technicity (including its transmutation into cybernetics) as a “throwback” to the abandonment of and by being ( Seinsverlassenheit ). (shrink)